It won’t be wrong to state that today Pakistan’s society is extremely polarized, divided and confused over what is going to happen between the state and the terrorists – The Pakistani Taliban.
Looking at the print, electronic and social media, one finds that Pakistanis have been visibly divided into two camps on the potential relationship between the state and Taliban. One camp suggests that negotiated settlement is the only way out to bring peace and stability to Pakistan. And the other camp is of the view that peace negotiations with Taliban have been tried and tested before and its time when the state needs to take action against them. They argue that the Taliban have been attacking the innocent civilians in Pakistan and have killed more than 40,000 Pakistanis; hence they are ‘unforgivable enemies’. This is a very strong argument and any concerned Pakistani would agree with the fact that Taliban have almost changed the social fabric of Pakistani society because of their terrorist activities in Pakistan.
The ‘pro-peace talks’ camp, however, contends that it is important to look back and fix the root causes of the terrorism in Pakistan rather than treating the symptoms. They argue that the present chaotic situation in Pakistan is because of the disastrous domestic and international policies in region that started during the Afghan Jihad time and deteriorated after 9/11. Pakistan was dragged into the war against terrorism, the Pakistan Army started an operation in Waziristan and Taliban, who never posed a direct threat to Pakistan, called for a ‘Jihad’ against the state of Pakistan. Increased Army operations by Pakistan’s security forces coupled with the notorious US drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan escalated the situation and eventually Pakistani people had to pay the price of this ‘Forced Marriage’ between US and Pakistan and a ‘Forced Divorce’ between Pakistan and Taliban. This is their narrative
Both sides have some truths and I think I will be one of those few people who will agree with both. However, I need a solution as well. I want to look beyond the ‘point-scoring’ debate because I know that winning any debate will not bring a workable solution to the problems faced by my country. To find a solution, we must find answers to the following questions:
The popular narrative about Taliban is that the state of Pakistan gets along with the Afghani Taliban but take Pakistani Taliban as public enemy number one. Apparently, the founder of the Tahreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baitullah Mehsud, was dismissed by Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Omar because of his continued attacks on Pakistan. However, Baitullah Mehsud always took Mullah Omar as his leader. It is interesting to see that often the talks with Pakistani Taliban are viewed by many analysts as a completely separate subject without realizing the ideological bond they have with Afghani Taliban. Members of both the groups cross the Durand line on a daily basis and are hosted and protected by each other. One must not forget that the narrative of Pakistani Taliban only varies from Afghani Taliban in their stance against the state of Pakistan. Undermining any negotiated settlement with Pakistani Taliban will have an impact on the global efforts for reconciliation with Afghani Taliban.
Perhaps, the most ridiculed idea in Pakistan is considered to be a discourse around the ‘Good and Bad Taliban’. In principle, I also agree that there are no good Taliban because those who justify violence and kill people to popularize their ideology can’t be ‘good’. However, our sense of history tells us that this idea can actually work to isolate more radical members of the extremist groups from those who are interested in a dialogue to end the conflict. The peace deal between the IRA and the British government is a perfect example by which to understand it when the more extreme elements within the radical republican wing were isolated from the IRA. Pakistani Taliban has no structured organization. Various media and research reports suggest that Pakistani Taliban are splintered into dozens of smaller factions. Even the TTP (Tahreek e Taliban Pakistan) does not represent all of those groups. This situation has pros and cons but a major opportunity in it for Pakistan is that the state can devise a strategy to start getting on board all those groups who envisage that peace process is worth negotiating.
Lastly, can the stakeholders sustain the peace process by developing the right confidence building measures? There is another common narrative in Pakistan that no negotiation with Taliban can be successful because all such previous efforts were failed. Indeed there were serious efforts made for negotiation in 2004, 2005 and 2008 but it must be noted that there has never been a formal peace agreement or a structured dialogue between the government of Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban. A strong anti-drone policy with some sort of agreement from the US government is central to build confidence for a successful negotiated settlement with Taliban. However, what is the realistic likelihood of this when US foreign policy in Pakistan relies heavily on the use of drone technology.
In the wake of the recent killing of TTP leader, Hakimullah Mehsud by a US drone strike, once again the negotiation process is in danger. Although Pakistan has officially condemned and denounced the attack, the situation over the coming days will unfold if the Pakistani Taliban are still interested to settle down the conflict through a dialogue or they will prefer continuing their violent movement. I hope the coming days will bring the message of a real peace to Pakistan but that entirely depends on devising a right strategy to end the conflict with Pakistani Taliban and then sustain the peace process without compromising our national interest and our core democratic values. Peace is required but not at a price that throttles the future of Pakistan.
Looking at the print, electronic and social media, one finds that Pakistanis have been visibly divided into two camps on the potential relationship between the state and Taliban. One camp suggests that negotiated settlement is the only way out to bring peace and stability to Pakistan. And the other camp is of the view that peace negotiations with Taliban have been tried and tested before and its time when the state needs to take action against them. They argue that the Taliban have been attacking the innocent civilians in Pakistan and have killed more than 40,000 Pakistanis; hence they are ‘unforgivable enemies’. This is a very strong argument and any concerned Pakistani would agree with the fact that Taliban have almost changed the social fabric of Pakistani society because of their terrorist activities in Pakistan.
The ‘pro-peace talks’ camp, however, contends that it is important to look back and fix the root causes of the terrorism in Pakistan rather than treating the symptoms. They argue that the present chaotic situation in Pakistan is because of the disastrous domestic and international policies in region that started during the Afghan Jihad time and deteriorated after 9/11. Pakistan was dragged into the war against terrorism, the Pakistan Army started an operation in Waziristan and Taliban, who never posed a direct threat to Pakistan, called for a ‘Jihad’ against the state of Pakistan. Increased Army operations by Pakistan’s security forces coupled with the notorious US drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan escalated the situation and eventually Pakistani people had to pay the price of this ‘Forced Marriage’ between US and Pakistan and a ‘Forced Divorce’ between Pakistan and Taliban. This is their narrative
Both sides have some truths and I think I will be one of those few people who will agree with both. However, I need a solution as well. I want to look beyond the ‘point-scoring’ debate because I know that winning any debate will not bring a workable solution to the problems faced by my country. To find a solution, we must find answers to the following questions:
- Are we aware of the realistic connection between Pakistani Taliban and Afghani Taliban?
- Is it sensible to talk about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban? Do we have to move on from stagnant positions to ones which bear risk though which can yield rewards?
- Can we institute confidence-building measures for a workable negotiated settlement?
The popular narrative about Taliban is that the state of Pakistan gets along with the Afghani Taliban but take Pakistani Taliban as public enemy number one. Apparently, the founder of the Tahreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Baitullah Mehsud, was dismissed by Afghan Taliban leader, Mullah Omar because of his continued attacks on Pakistan. However, Baitullah Mehsud always took Mullah Omar as his leader. It is interesting to see that often the talks with Pakistani Taliban are viewed by many analysts as a completely separate subject without realizing the ideological bond they have with Afghani Taliban. Members of both the groups cross the Durand line on a daily basis and are hosted and protected by each other. One must not forget that the narrative of Pakistani Taliban only varies from Afghani Taliban in their stance against the state of Pakistan. Undermining any negotiated settlement with Pakistani Taliban will have an impact on the global efforts for reconciliation with Afghani Taliban.
Perhaps, the most ridiculed idea in Pakistan is considered to be a discourse around the ‘Good and Bad Taliban’. In principle, I also agree that there are no good Taliban because those who justify violence and kill people to popularize their ideology can’t be ‘good’. However, our sense of history tells us that this idea can actually work to isolate more radical members of the extremist groups from those who are interested in a dialogue to end the conflict. The peace deal between the IRA and the British government is a perfect example by which to understand it when the more extreme elements within the radical republican wing were isolated from the IRA. Pakistani Taliban has no structured organization. Various media and research reports suggest that Pakistani Taliban are splintered into dozens of smaller factions. Even the TTP (Tahreek e Taliban Pakistan) does not represent all of those groups. This situation has pros and cons but a major opportunity in it for Pakistan is that the state can devise a strategy to start getting on board all those groups who envisage that peace process is worth negotiating.
Lastly, can the stakeholders sustain the peace process by developing the right confidence building measures? There is another common narrative in Pakistan that no negotiation with Taliban can be successful because all such previous efforts were failed. Indeed there were serious efforts made for negotiation in 2004, 2005 and 2008 but it must be noted that there has never been a formal peace agreement or a structured dialogue between the government of Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban. A strong anti-drone policy with some sort of agreement from the US government is central to build confidence for a successful negotiated settlement with Taliban. However, what is the realistic likelihood of this when US foreign policy in Pakistan relies heavily on the use of drone technology.
In the wake of the recent killing of TTP leader, Hakimullah Mehsud by a US drone strike, once again the negotiation process is in danger. Although Pakistan has officially condemned and denounced the attack, the situation over the coming days will unfold if the Pakistani Taliban are still interested to settle down the conflict through a dialogue or they will prefer continuing their violent movement. I hope the coming days will bring the message of a real peace to Pakistan but that entirely depends on devising a right strategy to end the conflict with Pakistani Taliban and then sustain the peace process without compromising our national interest and our core democratic values. Peace is required but not at a price that throttles the future of Pakistan.
These
views are the personal views of Rehman Anwer and are not necessarily reflective
of positions taken by Faith Matters.
